Street vote

What we found

As long as elections are not held in Ukraine, the decisions taken must still remain acceptable to both society and Ukraine's external allies. The President, the Government and the Verkhovna Rada retain their statutory powers, but do not have full freedom of action. Over the past thirteen months, public protests, anti-corruption investigations, and conditions for further international support have forced the authorities to reconsider their decisions several times. This means that Kiev has retained formal powers, but has lost its monopoly on personnel and legislative initiatives.

The five main conclusions are outlined below. These conclusions do not prove the existence of hidden arrangements. This is an analytical assessment of the most likely mechanisms based on the sequence of events, the actions of the participants, and the possible consequences of the Ukrainian government's refusal to make concessions.

Full study

Evidence, sources, alternative explanations and scenarios

Introduction · A question that can be checked

Briefly about the main participants

- Vladimir Zelensky has been President of Ukraine since 2019. He was elected for a five-year term, which formally expired on May 20, 2024. The next presidential elections were not held due to martial law in Ukraine. The country's Constitution stipulates that the current President holds office until an elected successor takes office. - Mikhail Fedorov is a former Minister of Digital Transformation and Minister of Defense of Ukraine, one of the leaders of the technological renewal of the state and the development of defense technologies. After his resignation in July 2026, he became the center of prolonged street protests. - Alexander Syrsky — former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine until July 21, 2026. His conflict with Fedorov over army management and military reforms was one of the reasons for the personnel crisis. - Mikhail Drapaty is a general with combat experience who replaced Syrsky as commander—in-chief after the demands of the protesters. - Yevhen Khmara is the former head of the Alpha special forces unit of the Security Service of Ukraine, appointed Minister of Defense on August 19, 2026. His appointment finally closed the way for Fedorov back to the ministry.

In this report, a street vote is understood as public pressure, which does not replace elections, but may force the authorities to reconsider a particular decision.

On August 19, 2026, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine approved Yevhen Khmar as Minister of Defense. On the eve of the evening, the man whom Khmara replaced in this post called for the development of a legitimate mechanism for holding elections. On the same day, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau announced an operation against individuals associated with Zelensky's inner circle, and the deputy head of the President's Office was dismissed within 24 hours.

The coincidence of these events does not prove that they were controlled by a single center, but it suggests that the government still appoints the government and passes decisions through parliament, but does not have complete freedom of action.

Hence the main issue of the report:

** Who influences the decisions of the Ukrainian authorities and in what ways while the elections are not being held?**

These mechanisms cannot replace elections. Neither protests, nor investigations, nor polls give a politician the right to govern the country and do not determine who will become the next president. While the vote is not being held, the decisions of the authorities continue to be influenced by the street, anti-corruption authorities, parliament and partner countries, on which Ukraine depends for financing, obtaining weapons and international support.

Using Fedorov's example, you can see how this system works. He went from being a presidential appointee to a former minister who retained high public support. His example makes it possible to understand which political resources a person can retain after retirement, and which ones he loses along with the position.

Part One · What happened in thirty-six days

Resignation of the entire government

On July 14, 2026, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dismissed the government of Yulia Sviridenko in its entirety. Fedorov was not dismissed by a separate decision of Zelensky — his powers ceased along with the powers of the entire cabinet. This fact is often overlooked, although it changes the assessment of what happened, because without it, resignation looks like a decision directed personally against Fedorov.

By itself, the resignation of the entire government does not mean that Zelensky has lost confidence in Fedorov. What happened next is more important. Fedorov did not join the new government, which was headed by Sergei Koretsky on July 16. Back on July 15, he publicly linked his departure to the conflict with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Alexander Syrsky, and stated that the ministry's initiatives were constantly blocked. Later, Fedorov refused the positions offered to him, and on July 31, he was expelled from the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine.

Therefore, it is not so much the resignation of the government itself that is important, as the chain of events that followed it.

Protest and resignation of the Commander-in-Chief

Since mid-July, rallies in support of Fedorov have been held in Kiev and a number of other cities. The organizers were not political party structures, but veterans of military operations — military medic Dmitry Kozyatinsky and lawyer Masi Nayem. There were three requirements:

- resignation of Syrsky; - Fedorov's return to the government; - Convocation of an extraordinary session of the Parliament of Ukraine.

The organizers gave the authorities until July 24.

And on July 21, Zelensky dismissed Syrsky and appointed Mikhail Drapaty commander-in-chief. This happened before the deadline. The other two requirements were not met. Fedorov did not return to the government, and an extraordinary session of parliament was not called.

Why did Fedorov change his position

On July 31, Fedorov told the New York Times that he did not want to engage in politics and did not intend to meet with protesters in his support.

However, eighteen days later, on the evening of August 18, he made an appeal and called for the development of a legitimate, safe and realistic electoral procedure. On the same day, Zelensky submitted to parliament the candidacy of a new Minister of defense. After that, Fedorov's return to the ministry became impossible.

Fedorov could have several reasons for such a statement. Perhaps he wanted to maintain public support, which is gradually declining without a constant presence in the public field. It is possible that he had political plans earlier, but he began to openly talk about them only after Khmara's appointment. Finally, Fedorov might have feared that the new leadership of the ministry would appropriate the results of his work. The available sources do not allow us to determine which of these reasons was the dominant one.

Three events on August 19th

On August 19, the Parliament of Ukraine approved Khmaru as Minister of Defense by more than three hundred votes. On the same day, NABU and SAP announced a new operation called Forest Gump. She was linked to the Midas case, a major investigation into an alleged corruption scheme in the energy sector, in which the investigation considers current and former Ukrainian officials, as well as entrepreneurs associated with them, to be participants.

One of the defendants in the Midas case was released from custody on bail of 150 million hryvnias. According to investigators, this amount was legalized through the accounts of shell companies. On the same day, Zelensky fired the deputy head of his Office, Irina Mudry.

If the investigation's version is confirmed, it's not just about a financial violation. Money could be collected and spent through enterprises to free a participant in a previous corruption scheme. This indicates mutual support within the group associated with the government's inner circle. To understand the relationships within this group, such a connection is more important than the sum itself.

Part Two · How decisions change without elections

In the cases reviewed, the government's decisions were influenced by street protests, anti-corruption investigations, and demands from Ukraine's international partners. Sometimes each of these factors acted separately, sometimes they reinforced each other. Polls by themselves do not change laws or lead to resignations, but they show the government and its opponents who the public supports.

Street protests

In July 2025, the Parliament of Ukraine passed a law limiting the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office. After that, the protests began. At the same time, the law was publicly criticized by representatives of the European Union. Nine days later, parliament canceled the controversial changes. In this case, domestic pressure coincided with the demands of foreign partners and forced the Ukrainian government to retreat.

In July 2026, the actions in support of Fedorov were accompanied by a new personnel crisis. The protesters demanded Syrsky's resignation and set a deadline. Zelensky made the decision before the expiration of this period. Public pressure has become one of the decisive factors in the resignation.

Anti-corruption investigations

In November 2025, shortly after the search, the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Andriy Ermak, resigned. As mentioned above, on August 19, Zelensky fired Irina Mudra. Both cases show that investigations can affect the president's inner circle and lead to quick personnel decisions.

The attempt to limit the independence of NABU and SAP has not stopped their work. The restrictions adopted by Parliament regarding them were promptly lifted. The conflict did not end there. On August 10, 2026, NABU and SAP declared pressure on the judges who considered the cases of their employees. This means that the struggle around Ukraine's anti-corruption authorities continues, although it is now taking place less openly.

External dependence and the role of Parliament

Ukraine depends on Western money, arms supplies, diplomatic support, and the prospect of joining the European Union. Therefore, its partner countries actually participate in the domestic policy of the country. They can make continued assistance dependent on meeting their demands and thereby influence Kiev's decisions.

No direct orders are needed for this. The terms of financing, access to international organizations, political support, and the possible consequences of refusal themselves influence Kiev's decisions. At the same time, it should be noted that the West is not a single center today. American, British and European structures can support different solutions and rely on different groups within the Ukrainian government.

Formally, decisions are made by the Verkhovna Rada. She dismisses the government, approves ministers, and enacts laws. But following the established procedure does not mean full sovereignty in decision-making. Public and external pressure can narrow the range of these politically acceptable solutions.

What polls show

While elections are not being held in Ukraine, polls show who is losing support and who is gaining it. This information is taken into account by the authorities, political groups and international donors of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the rating itself does not repeal the law and does not lead to resignation. In the cases considered, decisions were influenced by other factors, and the survey results only reflected the correlation of public sentiment.

Where does the impact of these mechanisms end

Protests, investigations, and external pressure may force the government to repeal the law or dismiss an official. But they cannot be used to choose a new leader and give him the legal right to govern the country.

This is clearly seen in the demands of the participants in the July protests. The government dismissed Syrsky, but did not return Fedorov to the government. The dismissal requirement was fulfilled, but not the appointment requirement.

This creates a serious problem for the authorities. Discontent is accumulating, but there is no legal way to change the leadership yet. Every successful protest and every investigation reinforces the expectation that pressure will produce results again. However, there is still no procedure by which the society could not only seek resignations, but also choose a new government in Ukraine.

Part Three · Why Zelensky's appointed officials are becoming his rivals

The Socis Ukrainian Research Center, which conducts public opinion polls, invited participants to imagine the second round of the presidential election and choose between Zelensky and each of his possible rivals. In three such pairs, the incumbent president lost.

As noted earlier, all three winners gained national fame due to their high government positions.

Petro Poroshenko represents the traditional opposition and was not a member of the current president's team. He turned out to be the only one of the four possible rivals to whom Zelensky did not lose in this comparison. Thus, it becomes clear that the main threat to him is not posed by former opponents, but by people who have gained national fame thanks to Zelensky's own appointments.

However, the position itself does not provide public support. Their reputation was determined by the results of their work, the circumstances of wartime and the attitude of society. Zelensky helped them become famous, but was unable to control their continued popularity.

Why a strong official can become Zelensky's rival

Appointing a weak leader threatens to be a failure for which the president himself will have to answer. A strong leader brings results, but along with fame, he receives his own public support.

After retirement, such a person is no longer obliged to maintain his former political loyalty.

Usually, the president can keep a popular subordinate within his team through party discipline, participation in elections, and a place on the ruling party's list. As long as elections are not held, these methods do not work. After dismissal, the politician is released from his previous obligations, while maintaining his accumulated popularity.

Where did Fedorov's supporters come from

According to the Ukrainian research center Socis, the decline in Zelensky's support coincided with an increase in Fedorov's rating.

The survey participants were also asked who they would vote for if their preferred candidate did not participate in the elections. Such answers are called second preferences. In this case, Fedorov's supporters more often chose Zaluzhny, somewhat less often Budanov. Only a small part was ready to support Zelensky again.

For the authorities, this means that Fyodorov's disappearance from politics will most likely not bring his supporters back to the president. They will be distributed among Zelensky's other rivals. However, the survey does not allow us to say that all the voters who left the president went over to Fedorov. The simultaneous drop in one rating and the rise of another does not prove a direct transfer of votes.

Why is the level of distrust important?

The Kiev International Institute of Sociology, a Ukrainian organization for the study of public opinion, has obtained the following results:

- 66 percent of respondents trust Zaluzhny, 24 percent do not trust him.; - 63 percent trust Fedorov, 16 percent do not trust him.; - 61 percent trust Budanov, 22 percent do not trust him.; - 56 percent trust Zelensky, 38 percent do not trust him.

The difference between them is only four points. This is not enough to confidently assert that Fedorov is ahead of Zaluzhny in this indicator.

Separately, the proportion of those who do not trust each politician should be compared. 16% of respondents do not trust Fedorov, 24% do not trust Zaluzhny. The observed difference is eight percentage points. At the same time, the published data is not enough to independently calculate the statistical significance of this particular comparison.

This indicator is important because it is usually more difficult to regain the trust of a person who is already opposed to a politician than it is to convince someone who has not yet decided. The low level of distrust means that Fedorov still has a large audience of potential supporters. For a politician who does not yet have his own party and electoral headquarters, this is the main advantage.

Part four · What a politician can save after retirement

After being fired, a politician can retain public support, a team, foreign connections, and access to funding. It depends on whether he is able to turn into an independent rival to the government.

If a person loses their team, connections, and money along with their position, their political influence gradually disappears. If these resources are preserved, the resignation does not eliminate the rival, but only releases him from his previous obligations to the government.

As of the date of the report, Fedorov definitely retained only public support. There are separate reports about the possible departure of part of his team, but they have not yet been confirmed. Foreign relations existed while he held government positions. It is unknown whether they continue to work after their retirement. He does not have his own political organization or confirmed sources of funding yet.

What resources did Fedorov save?:

- Public support — confirmed by polls after his resignation (polls were conducted from July 16 to July 31, when Fedorov no longer held office). Reliability of the assessment: high. - Team — possible departure of some employees after Fedorov; this was reported by one anonymous source, names and personnel decisions have not been published. Reliability of the assessment: low. - Foreign connections — existed during his time in power; there is no confirmation that these connections remained after his resignation and can now be independently used by Fedorov. Reliability of the assessment: low. - Own organization — there is no party, movement, or political structure, and no public signs have been found. Reliability of the assessment: high. - Financing — data has not been established, there is no information about own financing or political infrastructure in the public domain. Reliability of the assessment: low.

What is Fedorov's reputation based on

The high level of public confidence after his resignation shows that Fedorov's popularity was not only related to his position. But this does not mean that all statements about the results of his work are documented.

The most notable example concerns 300 billion hryvnias. Fyodorov's supporters claimed that an inspection conducted under him at the Ministry of Defense revealed inefficient spending of this amount in the defense sector.

The Main Directorate of Communications of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which is responsible for the official explanations of the army, stated that no large-scale inspections were carried out in combat brigades in 2026. The military command also did not receive information about the results of such an audit.

Perhaps it was about different checks. Fedorov could talk about the expenses of the Ministry of Defense itself, and the military's statement referred only to inspections in combat units. It is impossible to establish this for certain based on the published data.

Until the audit report itself, the list of verified expenses and the method of calculating the amount are published, 300 billion hryvnias cannot be considered a confirmed result. Therefore, this figure is not used in the main conclusions of the report.

Did the team leave with Fedorov

The Ukrainian socio-political publication Zerkalo Nedelya reported, citing an unnamed source, that some of the employees of the Ministry of Defense intend to leave after Fedorov. At the same time, the publication did not name either the names of these employees or the source of the information. The new minister, on the contrary, stated that he wants to keep the old team. Therefore, it is not yet possible to say that the staff really decided to switch to Fedorov.

The answer will be provided by the next official personnel decisions. If several deputies and heads of departments leave the ministry and then continue to work with Fedorov, he will have the backbone of his own team. If they remain in their positions, it means that they were united by their work in the ministry, and not by personal devotion to their former leader.

Part five · Possible development options

Below are four possible scenarios for the development of events over the next year. We do not specify their probability as a percentage, because there is not enough open data for an accurate calculation. Any numbers in such a situation would only give the appearance of accuracy.

At the same time, the course of hostilities or negotiations can change the political situation much faster than events inside the country.

Fedorov's support is gradually dissipating

Fedorov does not create his own political force. His former employees remain at the Ministry of Defense, and he speaks less and less publicly. Some of his supporters go to Zaluzhny, Budanov or other politicians.

Without his own team, steady work, and a clear political goal, Fedorov's popularity is gradually declining. At the same time, his rivals are either more popular or continue to hold government positions and retain access to the public platform.

The first signs are that prominent leaders are not leaving the ministry after Fedorov, there are no signs of their own political strength, and the autumn polls show a decrease in his support.

Fedorov creates his own team

Fedorov creates a political movement or permanent organization. He begins to speak regularly not only on defense issues, but also on other government topics. He gets a program, public representatives and understandable sources of funding.

To do this, three conditions must be met.

- There should be a demand for a new politician in the society.; - experienced managers who are ready to leave government positions should appear next to Fedorov.; - finally, these people should decide that working with him is more attractive to them than returning to the existing system of government.

The first signs are that several leaders are leaving the Ministry of Defense, an officially registered organization appears, its representatives begin to regularly speak on behalf of the general public and publish a political program.

Return to power

Zelensky offers Fedorov a position with real powers, and he agrees to return. For the president, this is a way to bring a possible rival back under control. For Fedorov, this is an opportunity to regain a position, a team, and access to government resources.

In this case, both will have to explain the abrupt change of position. Fedorov has already refused the posts offered to him three times. Zelensky, in turn, secured the appointment of a new defense minister, Yevgeny Khmara, who was supported by more than two-thirds of deputies.

The first signs are that Zelensky and Fedorov hold a confirmed meeting, stop publicly criticizing each other, after which the president offers Fedorov a specific position.

Elections are being called

The Parliament of Ukraine passes a law on holding elections, and the date of voting appears. After that, the main thing is not Fedorov's current rating, but his ability to create an electoral headquarters, find allies, receive funding and conduct a full-fledged campaign.

Protests and polls will remain important, but their compensating role will decrease in the absence of elections. The main issue of this report will lose its former relevance.

The first signs are that a draft law on elections has been submitted to Parliament, a training calendar has been published, and the voting procedure for military personnel, displaced persons, and citizens of Ukraine who are abroad has been determined.

Events that may make the options listed above irrelevant

Sudden changes in the course of hostilities or negotiations can completely change the internal political situation. In this case, the listed options will lose their significance, and the analysis will have to be carried out anew, taking into account new circumstances.

What to track — for each indicator:

- The departure of the team followed Fedorov. Not confirmed. Several deputies or managers are leaving the Ministry of Defense and continue to work with Fedorov. This shows that he has his own team. - Creation of a political force. There is no party, movement, or permanent team. Fedorov registers the organization, appoints representatives and begins permanent public work. - A change in the attitude of the population towards Fedorov. 16% of the respondents do not trust him. Since the beginning of open political activity, the level of distrust has been growing noticeably. This will show that the current support was due to the lack of serious criticism. - Preparation for the elections. There are no proposals, bills, or voting dates. A draft law on elections is submitted to Parliament and the terms of preparation are announced. After that, the main conclusion of the report will have to be revised. - The contact between Fedorov and Zelensky. There are no confirmed meetings after the conflict. A public meeting and an offer of a specific position will make Fedorov's return to power more likely.

Part Six · Which events will show that we were wrong

An analytical conclusion can only be verified if it is indicated in advance which new facts will force it to be abandoned. The events listed below will show that some of the conclusions of the report were erroneous or formulated too confidently.

Simultaneous pressure does not produce results. We assume that the Ukrainian authorities are more likely to make concessions precisely when society, government agencies and foreign partners are pressing simultaneously, rather than separately. If all three factors coincide several times, and the government does not back down, this conclusion will have to be revised. One case is not enough for this, because the decision may depend on other circumstances.

One factor is enough to change the decision. If the government starts to regularly give in to protests alone or anti-corruption investigations alone, it will no longer be necessary to combine them with external pressure into a common model. This will mean that each method of influence is able to work independently.

** Fedorov's support is declining sharply.** If, after the start of open political activity, confidence in Fedorov plummets, and the proportion of people who do not trust him significantly exceeds the current 16%, his current popularity will be temporary. A slight decrease will be a natural consequence of public criticism and will not in itself refute the conclusion. We are talking about a sharp drop in support.

The team remains at the Ministry of Defense. If the deputies and heads of departments retain their positions, it will mean that Fedorov does not have his own team outside the ministry. After his retirement, he retained public support, but did not receive the necessary support from former colleagues.

** Elections are scheduled.** If the Parliament of Ukraine passes the law on elections and a date for voting appears, the main conclusion of the report will have to be revised. Protests and investigations will continue to influence the government, but they will no longer partially compensate for the lack of a legitimate mechanism for changing leadership.

What we couldn't verify

- We were unable to find a detailed statement of the position of former Commander-in-Chief Alexander Syrsky on the causes of the conflict with Fedorov. Therefore, the point of view of the military command is not fully represented. - The announcement of the possible departure of part of the Fedorov team is based on the words of one unnamed interlocutor. The names of the employees and the decisions they made are unknown. - NABU and SAP have not published documents that would allow to establish the official status of all persons affected by the operation on August 19. Therefore, a search cannot automatically be considered an accusation or proof of guilt. - There is no audit report in the public domain, on the basis of which the amount of 300 billion hryvnias appeared. It is impossible to check the calculation itself and the list of expenses. - The polls were conducted before Fedorov's appeal on August 18. Therefore, they do not show how this speech affected the attitude of society. - Some of the decisions of the state bodies could not be verified using the original documents. In such cases, publications retelling their content were used. All such cases are listed separately in the notes.

Part seven · Limited independence of the Ukrainian government

The President, Parliament and the Government of Ukraine retain the right to make state decisions. At the same time, the freedom to make such decisions is limited by the country's dependence on Western money, arms supplies, diplomatic support, and the prospect of joining the European Union.

Ukraine's donor countries do not have to give direct orders. They may make continued assistance dependent on the adoption of certain laws, the preservation of specific government agencies, or the fulfillment of political conditions. Formally, the decision is made in Kiev, but a waiver of the requirements may lead to a reduction in funding, a delay in supplies, or a deterioration in relations with allies.

Therefore, foreign states and organizations actually participate in the internal politics of Ukraine. They are able to narrow down the range of politically acceptable solutions for the Ukrainian authorities.

Why can't we talk about a united West

The United States, Great Britain and the European Union do not always pursue the same goals. Their government agencies, political groups, and related organizations can support different people and offer different solutions.

The change of power in Washington has reinforced these differences. The ties that Ukrainian politicians have built under the Joe Biden administration do not necessarily retain their former importance under Donald Trump. The new American administration can rely on other intermediaries, officials, entrepreneurs and politicians.

Therefore, conflicts within the Ukrainian government may reflect not Kiev's resistance to external governance, but the struggle of several foreign centers for influence on a dependent political system. The decision formally remains with the Ukrainian authorities, but the boundaries of what is possible are largely determined outside the country.

What does this mean for Fedorov

During his time in government, Fedorov built relationships with American technology companies, Western donors, and organizations that supported Ukraine's digital and defense projects.

These connections can give him independent access to a part of the American political and business circles. Such a channel is not necessarily connected to those officials and organizations that Zelensky's entourage relied on during the Biden administration.

This allows us to consider Fedorov as a figure capable of relying on a different range of foreign connections. At the same time, there is not yet sufficient evidence to assert that he is directly supported by the Trump administration or that he is acting as its political representative.

When the external pressure gives a result

External pressure is especially effective when it coincides with demands from within Ukraine itself. This happened during the conflict over the anti-corruption authorities. The restrictions were opposed by street protesters and representatives of the European Union. Under joint pressure, the parliament quickly repealed the adopted law.

One demand from abroad may not be enough. But when it coincides with public discontent within the country, refusing to make concessions becomes more politically risky for the government.

Why defense decisions are important

Personnel decisions in the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine affect not only the management of troops. They also determine how much foreign partners trust the Ukrainian authorities to manage the funds and weapons provided.

The dispute over procurement and the expected audit results has shown that unverified figures are quickly becoming part of the political struggle. As long as the primary documents have not been published, neither the Ukrainian society nor the country's external allies can independently verify the statements of the parties.

Why every next crisis becomes more dangerous

The longer elections are not held in Ukraine, the more discontent accumulates in society. At the same time, there is no legal mechanism for changing the country's leadership yet.

For a State dependent on external support, this creates additional vulnerability. Any serious internal conflict becomes the focus of the allies' attention. They get the opportunity to support one of the parties, set conditions, or make further assistance dependent on making a specific decision.

Conclusion · What have the events of the last year in Ukraine shown?

The Ukrainian system of government continues to work. Parliament approves the Government and passes laws. Zelensky appoints ministers and changes the military command. Government agencies implement their decisions.

At the same time, the freedom of action of this system is becoming more and more limited. The decisions of the president and parliament are simultaneously influenced by street protests, anti-corruption authorities and foreign partners, on whose support the country depends.

In thirteen months, Parliament repealed a law that limited the independence of anti-corruption bodies. During the same period, the head of the Office of the President, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Deputy head of the Office of the President lost their positions. In each case, the combination of internal and external pressure made it more and more politically costly to maintain the previous solution.

But these ways of influencing are not a substitute for elections. Protests and investigations may force the government to repeal the law or dismiss an official. However, they do not allow the society to choose a new leader and give him the legal right to govern the country. Until a vote is held, the society can seek a review of individual decisions, but it cannot form a new government.

Fedorov's case shows another limitation of this system. After his retirement, he retained high public support. According to the polls cited above at the end of July, only 16% of the participants did not trust him. This was the lowest indicator of distrust among the politicians surveyed, and the survey was conducted after his departure from the government.

Nevertheless, popularity alone is not enough to become an independent political figure. Fedorov does not yet have a confirmed team outside the state apparatus, his own political force, or known sources of funding. After his resignation, he retained his reputation, but has not yet proved his ability to turn it into a political force.

Three main conclusions

What will Fedorov's political future show?

The first question is whether his deputies and heads of individual areas of the Ministry of Defense will leave after Fedorov.

If several people leave the ministry and continue to work with him, Fedorov will have the foundation of his own team. If they remain in their positions, it will mean that they were united by their work in the ministry, and not by personal devotion to the former head. In this case, Fedorov will remain a popular politician without his own political force and supporters.

The second question is whether the low level of distrust will remain after the start of open political activity. After joining the political struggle, he will face constant criticism, and the attitude of society may change.

The answers to both questions may appear in the coming months. They can be verified by official personnel decisions, the actions of Fedorov himself, and new opinion polls.

The report is based on open sources. The analysis covers events up to and including August 21, 2026. Later events were not included in the analysis. The sixth part indicates which new facts will force us to reconsider the main conclusions.

Application · How we checked disputed dates and events

When preparing the report, we compared several materials created by our analysts independently of each other. They had different dates, omitted important events, and described the same decisions in different ways.

Below you can find out what discrepancies we found, which option we used in the report, and why we chose it.

- Date of Fedorov's appeal about the elections. Discrepancy in materials: some indicate August 18, others August 19. The option used is: August 18, 21:57. The reason for the choice: time-related publications appeared on the evening of August 18. This is important because the appeal was made before the vote on the new minister. - Resignation of the government. Discrepancy in materials: part of the materials does not say that the entire Cabinet of Ministers resigned. An option was used: on July 14, the Parliament of Ukraine dismissed the entire government. The basis of the choice: it follows from the decision of the Verkhovna Rada. Fedorov was not dismissed by a separate decision, so it is wrong to consider his resignation personally directed against him. - Fyodorov's exclusion from the National Security Council of Ukraine. Material discrepancy: This event was omitted in the materials section. The option used is July 31. The reason for the choice: the date is specified in Presidential Decree No. 677/2026 on the change in the composition of the National Security and Defense Council. - Resignation of Commander-in-Chief Alexander Syrsky. Discrepancy of materials: it was indicated on July 21 or 22. The following option was used: the decision was announced on July 21, and official documents were processed on July 21 and 22. The basis of the choice: we separated Zelensky's public announcement and the subsequent legal formalization of the decision. - ** Fedorov's statement about his unwillingness to engage in politics.** Discrepancy in materials: This statement is omitted in almost all materials. The option used is July 31. The reason for the choice: on this day, Fedorov's interview with the New York Times newspaper was published. The original article is not available to us, so the content was checked against several publications that retold the interview.

Which remains only a version for now

The general dependence of the Ukrainian government on foreign support is confirmed by open data. However, it was not possible to establish the participation of specific States or organizations in individual personnel decisions in all cases.

- One publication claimed that a certain foreign center was involved in Fedorov's resignation. Other sources did not confirm this, and the publication itself did not provide any facts that can be verified. - There was a version that a foreign state is preparing its own candidate for future elections. The author of the publication used political assessments, but did not name specific people, sources of funding or actions confirming such support. - Fedorov's appeal and the new operation of the anti-corruption authorities occurred almost simultaneously. At the same time, open sources do not show that these events were coordinated in advance or that Fedorov influenced the course of the investigation. - There have been reports that part of the former minister's team is ready to leave after him. Until specific employees have been named and personnel decisions have been published, such a transition cannot be considered completed.

How events could show we were wrong

Source registry

1. 01
   The Verkhovna Rada appointed Yevhen Khmara minister of defence by 312 votes.

   Ukrainska Pravda · August 19, 2026
2. 02
   Mykhailo Fedorov's address on corruption, the crisis of governance and elections.

   Channel 24 · August 18, 2026
3. 03
   Decree dismissing Iryna Mudra as deputy head of the Office of the President.

   Channel 5 · August 19, 2026
4. 04
   Law of Ukraine on the Legal Regime of Martial Law.

   Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
5. 05
   Ruslan Stefanchuk on a special wartime election law and its one-time application.

   Hromadske · December 22, 2025
6. 06
   The Verkhovna Rada dismissed the government of Yuliia Svyrydenko.

   Ukrainska Pravda · July 14, 2026
7. 07
   Appointment of Serhii Koretskyi's government.

   Ukrainska Pravda · July 16, 2026
8. 08
   Mykhailo Fedorov on his departure, his conflict with Oleksandr Syrskyi and the obstruction of Ministry of Defence initiatives.

   Ukrainska Pravda · July 16, 2026
9. 09
   The protest organisers, their demands and the 24 July deadline.

   Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
10. 10
    Oleksandr Syrskyi's dismissal and Mykhailo Drapatyi's appointment.

    Address by the President of Ukraine · July 21, 2026
11. 11
    Fedorov's rejection of the post of deputy prime minister for military innovation.

    Meduza · July 23, 2026
12. 12
    Decree No. 677/2026 of 31 July 2026 changing the composition of the National Security and Defence Council.

    NV · July 31, 2026
13. 13
    Mykhailo Fedorov's 31 July 2026 interview with The New York Times, as reported by Lenta.ru on 1 August 2026.

    Lenta.ru · August 01, 2026
14. 14
    Submission of Yevhen Khmara's nomination to the Verkhovna Rada.

    Ukrainska Pravda · August 18, 2026
15. 15
    Initial reactions to Fedorov's election proposal.

    Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty · August 18, 2026
16. 16
    Details of Operation Forest Gump, the laundering of UAH 150 million and bail for a defendant in the Midas case.

    NV, citing NABU · August 19, 2026
17. 17
    Entry into force of the law curtailing NABU and SAPO independence, and the European Union's response.

    European Pravda · July 23, 2025
18. 18
    Restoration of NABU and SAPO independence.

    European Pravda · July 31, 2025
19. 19
    Andriy Yermak's resignation following NABU searches.

    Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) · December 01, 2025
20. 20
    NABU and SAPO leaders allege pressure on judges hearing cases involving bureau employees.

    Ukrainska Pravda · August 10, 2026
21. 21
    SOCIS poll conducted from 28 July to 2 August 2026. Two thousand respondents interviewed in person.

    Interfax-Ukraine · August 06, 2026
22. 22
    Fedorov's call for a mechanism to hold elections during the war and the political context of his address.

    Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty · August 18, 2026
23. 23
    Analysis of voter flows and second preferences using SOCIS data.

    Delovaya Stolitsa · August 07, 2026
24. 24
    Trust in political and public figures.

    Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) · July 31, 2026
25. 25
    Report that some members of Mykhailo Fedorov's team might leave the Ministry of Defence.

    Channel 24, citing Ukrainska Pravda and an unnamed member of Fedorov's team · August 19, 2026
26. 26
    Yevhen Khmara on his intention to retain key members of Fedorov's team responsible for defence procurement and international support.

    Channel 24 · August 19, 2026
27. 27
    The Economist's account of the spending audit, inspections and conflict between the Ministry of Defence and the military command, as summarised by Meduza.

    Meduza (summarising The Economist) · July 16, 2026
28. 28
    Statement by the Main Communications Directorate of the Armed Forces of Ukraine denying large-scale audits in combat brigades and disputing the UAH 300 billion estimate.

    Ukrinform · July 15, 2026
29. 29
    Performance figures for the state defence-technology platform Brave1 Market.

    Ukrinform · July 01, 2026
30. 30
    Dmytro Koziatynskyi on ending the daily protests, rejecting wartime elections and supporting the new defence minister, Yevhen Khmara.

    Euronews, citing Associated Press · August 20, 2026
31. 31
    Fedorov's team on a possible US trip to attract resources for defence-technology projects, and on the absence of planned meetings with American politicians.

    Ukrainska Pravda, citing Suspilne · August 20, 2026
32. 32
    Dmytro Koziatynskyi on ending the protests after Yevhen Khmara's appointment as minister of defence.

    UNN · August 19, 2026

Revision history